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CONSTITUTIONALISM, RIGHTS, AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE GLENISTER 
DECISION 
BY EDWIN CAMERON* 
INTRODUCTION 
It has been seventeen years since South Africa became a democracy 
under a supreme law, the Constitution. With the transition came a radical 
shift in the role of the legal system in our country. Under apartheid, the law 
was an instrument of oppression. In fact, the chief feature of apartheid was 
that it was a system of racist subordination that was articulated, enforced, 
and minutely regulated through the law. That legacy the constitutional 
negotiators determined to cast away. Instead, they embodied a series of 
high aspirations and promises in a visionary and ambitious document, the 
nation’s founding Constitution. 
In the nearly two decades since democracy, the South African 
Constitution has become widely regarded as one of the world’s most 
progressive founding charters.1  And the Court that is its guardian, South 
Africa’s highest court in constitutional matters, has given resonant content 
to the promise of constitutional rights. In a range of ground-breaking 
decisions, it has, for instance: 
 Ruled the death penalty unconstitutional;2 
 Declared that the “rendition” of an accused suspect to a 
country that imposes the death penalty is unconstitutional, and 
required the government to draw its ruling to the attention of 
the foreign country’s courts;3 
 In the midst of an impassioned public debate about the 
etiology of AIDS and the efficacy of anti-retroviral treatment, 
ordered the government to start making treatment available to 
 
  * Justice of the Constitutional Court of South Africa. This is a revised version of the Annual 
Herbert L. Berstein Lecture delivered at Duke University on September 8, 2011. 
 1. See generally Heinz Klug, The Constitution of South Africa: a Contextual Analysis 113 
(Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010)  (providing international assessments of the South African 
Constitution).  
 2. State v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC).  
 3. Mohamed v. President of South Africa 2001 (3) SA 893 (CC).  
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those living with HIV;4 
 Declared that resident non-citizens are entitled to social 
benefits;5 
 Insisted on full equality for gays and lesbians, including the 
right to marry.6 
A distinctive feature of the Constitution was its treatment of 
international law. Under apartheid, international law was reviled as a 
source of alien and hostile doctrines. For instance, on 30 November 1973, 
the United Nations General Assembly opened for signature and ratification 
the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the 
Crime of Apartheid (ICSPCA), which 76 countries have ratified.7 
Instead of treating international law as an enemy, the Constitution 
embraced it. It provided that international agreements that were approved 
by resolution of both houses of the legislature became binding “on the 
Republic.”8 It declared customary international law “law in the Republic,” 
unless inconsistent with statute or the Constitution.9 It required courts, 
when interpreting legislation, to prefer “any reasonable interpretation” that 
conforms with international law, over any alternative inconsistent 
interpretation.10 And, most significantly, it made provision for international 
 
 4. Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC).  
 5. Khosa v. Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC).  
 6. Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC). 
 7. G.A. Res. 3068 (XXVIII) U.N. GAOR 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, U.N. Doc. A/9030, at 75 
(Nov. 30, 1973). List of signatories available at UN TREATY COLLECTION , CHAPTER IV, HUMAN 
RIGHTS http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg_no=IV-
7&chapter=4&lang=en#1 (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).  
 8. Section 231 of the Constitution provides: 
 (1) The negotiating and signing of all international agreements is the responsibility of the 
national executive. 
(2) An international agreement binds the Republic only after it has been approved by 
resolution in both the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces, unless it is 
an agreement referred to in subsection (3). 
(3) An international agreement of a technical, administrative or executive nature, or an 
agreement which does not require either ratification or accession, entered into by the national 
executive, binds the Republic without approval by the National Assembly and the National 
Council of Provinces, but must be tabled in the Assembly and the Council within a reasonable 
time. 
(4) Any international agreement becomes law in the Republic when it is enacted into law by 
national legislation; but a self-executing provision of an agreement that has been approved by 
Parliament is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of 
Parliament. 
(5) The Republic is bound by international agreements which were binding on the Republic 
when this Constitution took effect.” S. AFR. CONST. § 231. 
 9. S. AFR. CONST. § 232 (“Customary international law is law in the Republic unless it is 
inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament.”).  
 10. S. AFR. CONST. § 233 (“When interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any 
reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with international law over any alternative 
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law in the Bill of Rights itself. It expressly cast an obligation on courts, 
when interpreting the Bill of Rights, to “consider international law.”11 
These provisions cut across the well-known debate amongst 
international law practitioners and scholars about how international law 
provisions interact with national law. The “monist” position, as is well 
known, is that the international and national legal rules form one, unified 
system.12 Hence, there is no need for a state to incorporate its international 
treaty obligations into its national law as these obligations automatically 
become domestically enforceable when the state ratifies the agreement.13 
International law “dualists,” on the other hand, view international law, 
which regulates the behavior of states, and domestic law, which regulates 
the behavior of individuals within states, as two separate yet coexisting 
spheres of law that operate on separate “planes.”14 In particular, dualists 
insist that domestic law must specifically translate international law into its 
sphere before it can have domestic effect.15 It was this divide, and in 
particular the fact that the Bill of Rights accorded express recognition to 
international law, that became part of the drama in the decision that is the 
subject of this lecture, and to which I now turn. 
I. BACKGROUND TO GLENISTER 
Since judgment was handed down on 17 March 2011, the decision in 
Glenister v. President of the Republic of South Africa16 has received both 
acclaim and criticism from legal scholars, political analysts, and civic-
minded South Africans. The case involved a challenge to the constitutional 
validity of legislation that disbanded the country’s elite corruption-fighting 
unit, the Directorate of Special Operations (DSO) (“the Scorpions”), and 
replaced it with the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI) 
(“the Hawks”).17 The decision was attended by very considerable political 
controversy. It was eventually challenged in court by a lone litigant, Mr. 
Hugh Glenister, though opinion polls seemed to indicate that he had very 
 
interpretation that is inconsistent with international law.”).  
 11. S. AFR. CONST. § 39(1) (“When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum- (a) 
must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality 
and freedom; (b) must consider international law; and (c) may consider foreign law”). 
 12. JOHN DUGARD, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE (Lucienne Walters, 
ed., 3d ed., 2005) at 47.  
 13. Id.   
 14. Id.  
 15. Id.  
 16. 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC). 
 17. Id.   
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wide cross-party and cross-racial support for his views.18 
One thing is worth noting from the outset. This case could never have 
been heard in the United States. Here, it seems U.S. courts would have 
considered Mr. Glenister an interfering busybody. By contrast, under the 
South African Constitution’s broad standing provisions, his challenge was 
heard and eventually vindicated in the Constitutional Court. Not only that, 
but the resulting judgment has been described as one of the most significant 
decisions on government accountability in post-apartheid South Africa. 
A. The “Scorpions” and South Africa’s body politic 
The Scorpions unit was established by the National Prosecuting 
Authority Act (NPA Act)19 in 2001 to deal with national priority crimes 
and to supplement the efforts of existing law enforcement agencies in 
tackling serious crime. It was located within the National Prosecuting 
Authority (NPA), whose independence the Constitution safeguards and 
requires.20 As a specialist unit, it enjoyed extensive powers of investigation. 
These included the power to gather, keep, and analyze information, and to 
institute criminal proceedings relating to organized crime and other 
specified offences, including high-level corruption.21 
B. Backdrop and political motivation 
The background to Mr. Glenister’s court challenge reveals the 
confluence of two different conceptions of the use of instruments of 
government: the use of state power, on the one hand, to pursue private, 
individual agendas; and the use of state power, on the other, to secure clean 
and accountable government. 
On one hand, political actors accused the Scorpions of selective 
investigation and enforcement of the law. The unit was alleged to have 
 
 18. According to opinion poll evidence Mr Glenister included in the record. For example, in 2008, 
Ipsos-Markinor conducted a survey of 1,496 adults in urban areas throughout South Africa. After 
adjustment and weighting, the survey represented the views of 6 911 000 South Africans. The survey 
looked into the public views on the disbandment of the Scorpions. According to the survey, 64% of 
South Africans held the view that disbandment of the Scorpions would be a bad idea.  
 19. Act 32 of 1998 § 7(1).  
 20. S. AFR. CONST. § 179(4) (“National legislation must ensure that the prosecuting authority 
exercises its functions without fear, favour or prejudice.”).  
 21. The National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998 § 7(1), prior to amendment, stated that  
“(1)  (a)  The President may, by proclamation in the Gazette, establish not more than three Investigating 
Directorates in the Office of the National Director, in respect of specific offences or specified categories 
of offences.” 
  Section 179 of the Constitution provides that the NPA has had original constitutional authority 
to institute criminal proceedings as also “to carry out any necessary functions incidental to instituting 
criminal proceedings.” 
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been used by one political faction to entrench itself by undermining its 
detractors.22 Many claimed that the Scorpions were a highly effective 
corruption-fighting unit.23 They contended that its independence allowed it 
to investigate, and to successfully prosecute, high-profile politicians guilty 
of corruption.24 Given the unit’s success, it was claimed to pose a threat to 
corrupt political leaders, who consequently sought to dissolve it.25 Others 
resented the powers and impact of the unit. They claimed that its 
“independence” was a front that allowed it to be used to persecute political 
enemies, in particular the enemies of President Thabo Mbeki.26 They 
further claimed that the unit’s investigations against prominent post-
transition politicians had a racial edge, and brought the new order into 
discredit.27 Ultimately, the controversy was about the factional use of 
power, with each side intently asserting the guilt of the other. 
C. Polokwane and the dissolution of the Scorpions 
The African National Congress (ANC), the ruling party, held its 
national conference in Polokwane in December 2007. There, President 
Mbeki was ousted as leader of the ANC. In his stead, Mr. Jacob Zuma was 
elected. One of the most significant resolutions the conference adopted was 
 
 22. See, e.g., Mbeki’s Government Sounds Death Knell for Scorpions. MAIL AND GUARDIAN, May 
4, 2008) available at http://mg.co.za/article/2008-05-04-mbekis-govt-sounds-death-knell-for-scorpions 
(“Zuma’s camp accused the Scorpions of engaging in a plot to smear and deny Zuma the ANC top 
job… [and] [t]he Scorpions had waged a turf war with the police and were accused of using their power 
to settle scores, most notably in Zuma’s corruption case but also in an investigation of the country’s 
police chief.”). 
 23. As one commentator noted: “Defenders of the Scorpions often argue that it was a successful 
and laudable body because it won more than 90% of the cases it brought to court.”  PIERRE DE VOS, 
Scorpions was not Truly Independent. CONSTITUTIONALLY SPEAKING, Mar 22, 2011, available at  
http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/scorpions-was-not-truly-independent. 
 24. See DA: Scorpions are the last effective corruption busters, MAIL AND GUARDIAN, Feb. 5, 
2008 available at http://mg.co.za/article/2008-02-05-da-scorpions-are-the-last-effective-
corruptionbusters (reporting that the opposition party took this position). 
 25. See, e.g., MICHAEL HAMLYN, Scorpions’ disbanding ‘is to protect ANC’, MAIL AND 
GUARDIAN, Jan. 21, 2008,  available at http://mg.co.za/article/2008-01-21-scorpions-disbanding-is-to-
protect-anc; Demise of Scorpions ‘Meant to Shield ANC Members’, MAIL AND GUARDIAN Aug. 6, 
2008.  
 26. See, e.g., PIERRE DE VOS, supra note 23.  (“[T]he argument was advanced that the Scorpions 
had become a law unto itself and had been abused by politicians who used the Scorpions to target some 
but not other politicians. President Mbeki, so the argument went, used the Scorpions to target Jacob 
Zuma, but this was unfair because many politicians had done corrupt things but only a few like Zuma 
were targeted by the Scorpions.”).  
 27. See,  e.g,. ANDRE GROBLER Dissent and Disgust at Hearing on Scorpions’ Future MAIL & 
GUARDIAN, (Aug 14, 2008) available at http://mg.co.za/article/2008-08-14-dissent-and-disgust-at-
hearing-on-scorpions-future(alleging that the Scorpions “in most cases entered into plea bargains with 
white people while in many cases black people were prosecuted.”).  
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an express decision requiring the dissolution of the Scorpions.28 
II. MR. GLENISTER’S CHALLENGE 
In April 2008, the Cabinet approved draft legislation that dissolved the 
DSO and replaced it with a specialized crime-fighting unit, the DPCI.29 
This unit would be located within the South African Police Services 
(SAPS).30 Mr. Glenister launched an anticipatory challenge in response to 
the Cabinet decision and was rebuffed in the High Court.31 In October 
2008, the Constitutional Court, too, rejected the challenge.32 The Court 
ruled that Mr. Glenister had failed to establish justification for judicial 
intervention in the affairs of Parliament.33 The Court left open the 
possibility that it might intervene in the legislative process if “material and 
irreversible harm” would otherwise result—but Mr. Glenister had not 
shown any such harm.34 
The very next day, Parliament passed the National Prosecuting 
Authority Amendment Act35 (NPA Amendment Act) and the South African 
Police Service Amendment Act36 (SAPS Amendment Act). On 27 January 
2009, President Zuma gave the laws his assent. In response, Mr. Glenister 
brought renewed proceedings challenging the statutes’ constitutional 
validity.37 Two judges of the Western Cape High Court dismissed his 
application.38 He consequently applied for leave to appeal to the 
Constitutional Court or, alternatively, for direct access to the Constitutional 
 
 28. 52nd National Conference Resolutions Dec. 20, 2007.  The resolution dissolving the Scorpions 
provided: 
SINGLE POLICE SERVICE 
The constitutional imperative that there be a Single Police Service should be implemented.  
The municipal, metro and traffic police, be placed under the command and control of the 
National Commissioner of the South African Police Service, as a force multiplier.  
The Directorate of Special Operations (Scorpions) be dissolved.  
Members of the DSO performing policing functions must fall under the South African Police 
Services.  
The relevant legislative changes be effected as a matter of urgency to give effect to the 
foregoing resolution. 
 29. National Prosecuting Authority Amendment Act 56 of 2008.  
 30. South African Police Service Amendment Act 57 of 2008.  
 31. Glenister v. President of . South Africa 2009 (1) SA 143. (ZAGPHC).   
 32. Glenister v. President of South Africa 2009 (1) SA 287 (CC) [hereinafter Glenister I]. 
 33. Id.  at para. 57.  
 34. Id.  
 35. National Prosecuting Authority Act 56 of 2008.   
 36. South African Police Service Amendment Act 57 of 2008. 
 37. Glenister v President of South Africa 2010 (1) SA 92 (ZAWCHC) [hereinafter, Glenister II].  
 38. Id.   
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Court.39 
 
III. MR. GLENISTER’S LEGAL STANDING AND THE AMICUS 
INTERVENTION 
Mr. Glenister is a businessman. He brought the application on the 
basis of his own interest in the survival and growth of the economy.40 This, 
he alleged, was threatened by crime and thus by the disbanding of an 
effective crime-fighting unit such as the DSO.41 In addition, he brought the 
application in the interest of the group or class of persons affected by the 
legislation, and in the public interest.42 
As I mentioned earlier, Mr. Glenister’s suit would have been 
dismissed in many legal systems on the basis that he lacked legal standing 
to challenge the legislation.43 However, the broad standing provisions in the 
Bill of Rights made his challenge possible.44 
 
 39. S. AFR. CONST, § 167 (allowing applicants, in exceptional circumstances, to apply directly to 
the Constitutional Court.). Section 167(6)(a) provides:“(6) National legislation or the rules of the 
Constitutional Court must allow a person, when it is in the interests of justice and with leave of the 
Constitutional Court- (a) to bring a matter directly to the Constitutional Court.” 
The Notice of Motion submitted by Mr Glenister prayed for leave to appeal to the constitutional Court 
or, in the alternative, for direct access to the Court. See also Glenister II at para. 3.  
 40. For descriptions of the capacity in which Mr. Glenister sued, see Glenister I at 4 para. 5.   
 41. Id.   
 42. Id.   
 43. The impossibility of this case being brought in U.S. federal courts results not just from the 
more limited set of obligations placed upon the state in the U.S. Constitution. Even if an obligation to 
establish and maintain an independent body to combat corruption and organized crime were to be read 
into the U.S. Constitution, the American twin of Mr. Glenister would likely not have standing in a U.S. 
federal court to bring suit. This is because she would likely not be able to show that she, or any class 
which she may seek to represent, suffered injury in fact as a result of the legislation dismantling the 
Scorpions and establishing the Hawks. The “case or controversy” requirement of Art. III, Section 2 of 
the U.S. Constitution has been interpreted to impose strict standing requirements that have no analogue 
in South African law. South African citizens have the right, by virtue of section 38 of the South African 
constitution, to seek relief from an appropriate court wherever their rights have been “infringed or 
threatened..” In contrast, a complainant will not have standing in a U.S. federal court without showing 
that: first, the conduct sought to be challenged has caused injury in fact; and second, the interest sought 
to be protected is within the zone of interests that was intended to be protected by the constitutional 
guarantee in question. See Ass’n of Data Processing Service Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152—53 
(1970). It should be noted that, if Mr. Glenister’s American twin could establish that the disbanding of 
the Scorpions and the establishment of the Hawks would necessarily result in increased corruption and 
organized crime, and she could also show that she, personally, would experience injury as a result 
(economic or otherwise), then she could be found to have standing to challenge the impugned 
legislation. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 
U.S. 669, 686 (1973).  
 44. Section 38 of the Constitution sets out a broad approach to standing by, providing that: 
 Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent court, alleging that a right in 
the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and the court may grant appropriate relief, 
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Section 38 of the Constitution lists the persons that may approach the 
Court to allege an infringement of any right in the Bill of Rights.45 It grants 
standing to anyone acting in his or her own interest; to anyone acting on 
behalf of another person who cannot act in his or her own name; to anyone 
acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of persons; to 
anyone acting in the public interest; and to any association acting in the 
interest of its members.46 
Although urged to do so in the past, the Court has declined to take a 
narrow approach to these provisions. Instead, it has emphasized that the 
standing provision is aimed at ensuring the full and proper protection of 
constitutional rights.47 It was under these broad provisions that Mr. 
Glenister’s plea for access to the Court was granted without challenge from 
the government.48 
To this should be added that the Court has generous rules governing 
the admission of amici curiae.49 And indeed the amicus in this case, the 
Helen Suzman Foundation, played a crucial part in the adjudication. The 
principal arguments that Mr. Glenister’s own legal team advanced on 
statutory invalidity (that the legislation was irrational,50 and that it was 
invalid because of political taint51 and because of want of public 
 
including a declaration of rights. The persons who may approach a court are -  
(a) anyone acting in their own interest;  
(b) anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their own name;  
(c) anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of persons;  
(d) anyone acting in the public interest; and  
(e) an association acting in the interest of its members. 
S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 2, § 38.  
 45. Section 38 diverges radically from the narrow standing requirements in the pre-constitutional 
South African common law. Those required that a person approaching the court for relief must 
demonstrate an interest in the subject matter of the litigation, in the sense that he or she was personally, 
adversely affected by the impugned conduct. See Lawyers for Human Rights v. Minister of Home 
Affairs 2004 (4) SA 125 (CC) at 9 para. 14.  
 46. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 2, § 38.  
 47. Ferreira v. Levin NO 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) at 241 para. 165 (S. Afr.) stated that— 
“Whilst it is important that this Court should not be required to deal with abstract or hypothetical issues, 
and should devote its scarce resources to issues that are properly before it, I can see no good reason for 
adopting a narrow approach to the issue of standing in constitutional cases. On the contrary, it is my 
view that we should rather adopt a broad approach to standing. This would be consistent with the 
mandate given to this Court to uphold the Constitution and would serve to ensure that constitutional 
rights enjoy the full measure of the protection to which they are entitled.”  
 48. Glenister I at 4–5 paras. 5–7 (accepting the capacity and standing of the applicants without 
challenge). See also Glenister II at 83 para. 161.  
 49. Rule 10 of the rules of the Constitutional Court provides that “any person interested in any 
matter before the Court” may apply for amicus status. “Interest” has here, too, been interpreted very 
amply. Government Notice R1675 (S. Afr.). 
 50. Glenister II at paras. 59, 162.   
 51. Id.  at paras. 71–82, 162.  
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consultation preceding its enactment52) were rejected.53 However, the 
arguments that ultimately found favor with the Court were in essence those 
the amicus advanced.54 
IV. ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT 
The case distilled to two main issues. The first was the nature of 
government’s obligations in dealing with corruption. Do the international 
law obligations resting on the state oblige it to create an independent anti-
corruption unit? If so, do these obligations find direct intra-country 
constitutional force? Or are they obligations under international law alone? 
To elicit the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court, an applicant must 
show that his case raises a “constitutional issue.”55 There was no doubt that 
the debate about the extent of government’s anti-corruption obligations 
raised a constitutional issue. If there were an in-country constitutional 
obligation to create an independent anti-corruption unit, the second 
question was whether the DPCI was in fact sufficiently independent. 
Both the majority and the minority recognized that under international 
law the state is obliged to establish and maintain an independent body to 
combat corruption and organized crime.56 But the Court split five to four on 
two crucial questions regarding this obligation. The first was its source; the 
second was its intra-country impact. 
The majority57 held that the source is the Constitution itself.58 
Although the Constitution does not in express terms command that a 
corruption-fighting unit should be established, its scheme taken as a whole 
imposes a strong (“pressing”) duty on the state to set up a concrete, 
 
 52. Id.  at paras. 33–38, 162.  
 53. Id.  at paras. 38, 70, 82,16. 
 54. Many of the arguments raised by the amicus are discussed and accepted by the majority. Id.  at 
paras. 175–206, 210–50.  
 55. Section 167 provides in part: 
(3) The Constitutional Court- 
(a) is the highest court in all constitutional matters; 
(b) may decide only constitutional matters, and issues connected with decisions on 
constitutional matters; and 
(c) makes the final decision whether a matter is a constitutional matter or whether an 
issue is connected with a decision on a constitutional matter. 
. . . 
(7) A constitutional matter includes any issue involving the interpretation, protection or 
enforcement of the Constitution. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 8, § 167.  
 56. Glenister II at 56 para. 115 (minority) and 96–101 paras. 183–89 (majority). 
 57. The majority judgment was written jointly by Moseneke DCJ and Cameron J, with Froneman 
J, Nkabinde J and Skweyiya J concurring. Id.  at 83–130. 
 58. Id.  at 100–03 paras.189–95.  
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effective and independent mechanism to prevent and root out corruption.59 
Read together, the international and constitutional law obligations of the 
state require that it establish a corruption-fighting unit that is adequately 
independent. 
The majority thus held, first, that the obligation was constitutionally 
domesticated and, second, that its impact was to require legislation 
designed to counter corruption subject to constitutional scrutiny. The 
majority therefore proceeded to scrutinize the statutory provisions that 
established the DPCI.60 This led to a third major difference within the 
Court. The majority held that the body was insufficiently insulated from 
political influence in its structure and functioning.61 This was because the 
form of oversight exercised over the unit made it vulnerable to political 
influence.62 In addition, the safeguards against interference the provisions 
erected were inadequate to save the DPCI from a significant risk of 
political influence and interference.63 
The minority,64 by contrast, found against the challenge and would 
have dismissed the appeal. It would have held that the Constitution (section 
7(2) in particular) does not specifically impose an obligation on the state to 
establish an independent corruption-fighting unit.65 Even if a constitutional 
obligation of this sort existed, the dissenting judgment considered that the 
structural and operational autonomy afforded the DPCI was adequately 
designed to prevent undue interference.66 The DPCI’s independence was 
thus safeguarded. 
V. THE DOMESTICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: WEAVING 
TOGETHER SECTIONS 39(1) AND 7(2) 
My main remaining focus is the majority reasoning on the first issue—
in particular, the judgment’s treatment of the state’s international law 
obligations and their domestication. As a starting point, it is useful to 
understand these obligations before going on to explore the Court’s 
reasoning. 
 
 59. Id.  at 91 para. 175.  
 60. Id. at 109–28 paras. 208–48.  
 61. Id. at 128–29 paras. 248–50.  
 62. Id.   
 63. Id.   
      64.   The minority judgment was written by Ngcobo CJ, with Brand AJ, Mogoeng J and Yacoob J 
concurring. Id. at 1–82.   
 65.  Id. at 55–56 para.113. 
 66.  Id. at 81 para. 156.  
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A. South Africa’s international law obligations and the Constitution 
Various international treaties South Africa has ratified impose an 
obligation to create independent institutions to investigate and deal with 
corruption. The international instruments the Republic has signed and 
ratified include: 
 the United Nations Corruption Convention;67 
 the African Union Convention;68 
 the OECD Convention;69 
 the United Nations Organized Crime Convention;70 and 
 two Southern African Development Community protocols.71 
 
It is worth underscoring that “ratification” of international treaties 
occurs when both branches of the South African legislature adopt a 
resolution approving the treaty.72 This provides an element of express and 
active legislative assent that many might think would resonate 
domestically. That became one of the most contentious issues in the case. 
Article 6(1)(a) of the U.N. Corruption Convention requires each party 
state to guarantee the existence of a body tasked with the prevention of 
corruption.73 Article 6(2) requires the state to grant the body “the necessary 
independence, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal 
system, to enable [it] to carry out its . . . function effectively and free from 
undue influence.”74 South Africa ratified the U.N. Convention on 22 
 
 67.  United Nations Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4. U.N. Doc. A/58/422 (Dec. 9, 
2003). South Africa ratified the United Nations Corruption Convention on 22 November 2004.  
 68. The African Union Convention was adopted on 11 July 2003 and entered into force on 5 
August 2006. South Africa signed the Convention on 16 March 2004 and  ratified the Convention on 11 
November 2005. African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, Jul. 11, 2003  
 69. OED Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, Jun, 19, 2007. South Africa ratified the OECD Convention on 19 June 2007. 
 70. United Nations Convention Against Transactional Organized Crime, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 
(Nov. 15, 2000). Ratified by South Africa on 20 February 2004.  
 71.  Southern African Development Community Protocol Against Corruption (SADC Corruption 
Protocol), Aug. 14, 2001; Southern African Development Community Protocol on Combating Illicit 
Drugs (SADC Drugs Protocol), Aug. 24, 1996.   
 72. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch.14, § 231(2). 
 73. Article 6(1)(a) states: 
1. Each State Party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal system, ensure 
the existence of a body or bodies, as appropriate, that prevent corruption by such means as: 
(a) Implementing the policies referred to in article 5 of this Convention and, where appropriate, 
overseeing and coordinating the implementation of those policies. 
United Nations Convention Against Corruption, art. 6(1)(a), G.A. Res. 58/4. U.N. Doc. A/58/422 
(Dec. 9, 2003). 
 74. Id.  art. 6(2). 
CAMERON FINAL VERSION 3 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2013  11:01 AM 
400 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 23:389 
November 2004 and this ratification included formal adoption of the 
Convention by resolution of both houses of Parliament pursuant to the 
terms of section 231(2) of the Constitution.75 
In addition, Parliament enacted the Prevention and Combating of 
Corrupt Activities Act (PRECCA).76 PRECCA provides for practical 
measures to investigate corruption, but of more immediate significance to 
the litigation was the statute’s preamble, which lavishly expounds the 
socially and politically corrosive effects of corruption.77 These are that 
corruption undermines the Bill of Rights, damages democratic institutions, 
requires international cooperation, and is a prime responsibility of the 
state.78 The applicant invoked all of these premises to give constitutional 
force to his complaint against DPCI.79 
The crucial conclusion the majority reached is that the obligation to 
create an adequately independent corruption-fighting unit was not sourced 
in international law alone. Instead, it stems from the Constitution itself and, 
what is more, it has direct domestic constitutional force. To reach this 
conclusion, various grounds within the Constitution were explored. 
B. Section 231 
One possible line of argument relied on the binding nature of the 
Republic’s obligations under section 231(2) of the Constitution. Pursuant to 
section 231(2), an international agreement “binds the Republic” after it has 
been approved by resolution in both the National Assembly and the 
 
 75. Glenister II at 40–41 n.64, (“The Convention was adopted on 31 October 2003 and entered 
into force on 14 December 2005. South Africa signed the Convention on 9 December 2003 and ratified 
it on 22 November 2004. We have not been able to establish whether the Convention was in fact 
approved by a resolution of Parliament as required by section 231(2) of the Constitution. Having regard 
to legislative practice, it appears that once an international agreement has been approved by resolutions 
of both the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces, the executive publishes a notice 
in the Government Gazette for the general information of the public. See, for example, GN 1534 GG 
32722, 20 November 2009 (confirming approval, by resolution in both the National Assembly and the 
National Council of Provinces, of the Protocol of 1992 to amend the International Convention on the 
Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971).”).  
 76. Act 12 of 2004 (S. Afr.). 
 77. For example, the preamble to PRECCA states inter alia that: “corruption and related corrupt 
activities . . . endanger the stability and security of societies, undermine the institutions and values of 
democracy and ethical values and morality, jeopardise sustainable development, the rule of law and the 
credibility of governments, and provide a breeding ground for organised crime; . . . the illicit acquisition 
of personal wealth can be particularly damaging to democratic institutions, national economies, ethical 
values and the rule of law; . . . corruption is a transnational phenomenon that crosses national borders 
and affects all societies and economies, and is equally destructive and reprehensible within both the 
public and private spheres of life, so that regional and international cooperation is essential to prevent 
and control corruption and related corrupt activities.” Id.  
 78.  Id.   
 79. See Glenister II at para. 85.  
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NCOP.80 Purely “technical, administrative or executive” treaties take effect 
without express parliamentary adoption.81 The National Assembly ratified 
the U.N. Convention against Corruption on 14 September 2004 and the 
NCOP ratified the convention on 21 September 2004. 
This provision must be read with the provisions of the Constitution 
that define what “the Republic” is. The crucial question was whether the 
legislature was directly bound because “the Republic” was bound. 
Section 43 of the Constitution is headed “Legislative authority of the 
Republic.”82 It provides that “in the Republic, the legislative authority” in 
the national sphere “is vested in Parliament.”83 Section 44(4) requires that, 
when exercising its legislative authority, “Parliament is bound only by the 
Constitution, and must act in accordance with, and within the limits of, the 
Constitution.”84 Since the treaties in question were indeed approved by 
Parliament and therefore “bind the Republic” whose legislative authority is 
vested nationally in Parliament, the argument was that the treaty 
obligations were directly binding on Parliament itself. 
The argument would have had the effect that every time Parliament 
ratifies an international agreement, it limits its own legislative power and 
must henceforth legislate only in accordance with the treaty in question. 
This effect would have been subject to an obvious limitation—namely that 
 
 80. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch.14, § 231. This line of argument was dealt with by the minority at 
paras. 87–103 and by the majority at paras. 180–82. Section 231 of the Constitution, headed 
“International agreements” provides:  
(1) The negotiating and signing of all international agreements is the responsibility of the 
national executive. 
(2) An international agreement binds the Republic only after it has been approved by 
resolution in both the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces, unless it is 
an agreement referred to in subsection (3). 
(3) An international agreement of a technical, administrative or executive nature, or an 
agreement which does not require either ratification or accession, entered into by the 
national executive, binds the Republic without approval by the National Assembly and the 
National Council of Provinces, but must be tabled in the Assembly and the Council within 
a reasonable time. 
(4) Any international agreement becomes law in the Republic when it is enacted into law 
by national legislation; but a self-executing provision of an agreement that has been 
approved by Parliament is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution 
or an Act of Parliament. 
(5) The Republic is bound by international agreements which were binding on the Republic 
when this Constitution took effect. 
 81. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch.14, § 231(3).  
 82. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch.4, § 43.  
 83. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch.4, § 43(a).  
 84. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch.4, § 44(4).  
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Parliament cannot by ratifying a treaty adopt provisions incompatible with 
those of the Constitution.85 
Nevertheless, this line of reasoning would have had a radical 
consequence—that legal obligations in international treaties ratified by the 
Republic would become directly “constitutionalized.” The Court, however, 
did not favor this argument. It held that: 
 
[T]he main force of section 231(2) is directed at the Republic’s legal 
obligations under international law, rather than transforming the rights 
and obligations contained in international agreements into home-grown 
constitutional rights and obligations. Even though the section provides 
that the agreement “binds the Republic” and Parliament exercises the 
Republic’s legislative power, which it must do in accordance with and 
within the limits of the Constitution, the provision must be read in 
conjunction with the other provisions within section 231. Here, section 
231(4) is of particular significance. It provides that an international 
agreement “becomes law in the Republic when it is enacted into law by 
national legislation”. The fact that section 231(4) expressly creates a path 
for the domestication of international agreements may be an indication 
that section 231(2) cannot, without more, have the effect of giving 
binding internal constitutional force to agreements merely because 
Parliament has approved them. It follows that the incorporation of an 
international agreement creates ordinary domestic statutory obligations. 
Incorporation by itself does not transform the rights and obligations in it 
into constitutional rights and obligations.86 
C. Section 7(2) 
But the rejection of the argument based solely on section 231 did not 
mean that the Republic’s ratification of the international treaties had no 
domestic constitutional impact. On the contrary, the majority held that the 
provision remains highly pertinent. It found that the binding nature of 
international law obligations on the Republic was most significant when 
the Court interprets the state’s obligations under section 7(2) of the Bill of 
Rights.87 
Section 7(2) of the Bill of Rights requires that the “state must “respect, 
protect, promote and fulfill the rights in the Bill of Rights.”88 It is these 
 
 85. Glenister II at pars. 98–100; 180–82. 
 86. Glenister II at para. 181.  
 87. See Glenister II at paras. 189–92.  
 88. S. AFR. CONST., 1996,  ch. 2, § 7(2.) Section 7(2) of the Bill of Rights states that “The state 
must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of rights.” Professor Henry Shue, in his 
ground-breaking work on international distributive justice, argued that it is incorrect to say that rights 
are either positive or negative—instead, they all require the performance of multiple kinds of duties, 
including by the state. He names three kinds of duties which must necessarily be performed if a basic 
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very rights that corruption undermines. Indeed, this is precisely what 
Parliament recognized when it enacted the lavishly expressive preamble to 
PRECCA.89 
PRECCA affords outspoken legislative recognition to the fact that 
corruption undermines the Bill of Rights. From this, the majority reasoned 
it must follow that the state’s and also Parliament’s obligation to respect, 
protect, promote and fulfill those rights embraces a duty to create effective 
anti-corruption institutions.90 
The potent question was this: what is the content of that duty? Here, 
the majority invoked the crucial interpretive clause that I mentioned 
earlier.91 It appears at the end of the Bill of Rights chapter in the 
Constitution. In provides that when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court 
“must consider” international law.92 This means, the majority found, that 
when in interpreting what the state’s obligations are under section 7(2), the 
court “must consider” international law. It follows that the court “must 
consider” in determining the ambit of those obligations that the Republic is 
under an international law obligation to create anti-corruption institutions, 
and that these institutions must have “the necessary independence.” 
This reasoning was buttressed by the conclusion that the failure by 
Parliament, when abolishing the DSO, to invest the DPCI with the 
necessary autonomy in relation to its anti-corruption activities, rendered the 
legislation invalid. 
The majority judgment went further. Invoking the Court’s own 
previous decisions,93 it found that implicit in section 7(2) is the obligation 
that the steps the state takes to protect and fulfill constitutional rights must 
be reasonable.94 The majority concluded in the following excerpt that it is 
 
right is to be fulfilled: (i) duties to protect; (ii) duties to avoid; and (iii) duties to aId.  See H Shue, Basic 
Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy 52 (2nd ed.1996). Professor Fredman has 
recently set out how Shue’s three-fold classification has been adopted in the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). The ICESCR provides that all rights impose 
correlative duties on the State to respect, protect and fulfill them. See SANDRA FREDMAN, HUMAN 
RIGHTS TRANSFORMED: POSITIVE RIGHTS AND POSITIVE DUTIES 69 (2008). 
 89. See supra note 77.  
 90. See Glenister II at paras. 175–78.  
 91. Glenister II at para. 192.  
 92. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 2, § 39(1)(b).  
 93. Rail Commuters Action Grp. v. Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail, 2005 (2) SA 359 (CC) at 61 para. 
86 (S. Afr.) 
(“The duty thus identified requires Metrorail and the Commuter Corporation to ensure that reasonable 
measures are in place to provide for the safety of rail commuters. The standard of reasonableness 
requires the conduct of Metrorail and the Commuter Corporation to fall within the range of possible 
conduct that a reasonable decision-maker in the circumstances would have adopted.”) (footnotes 
omitted).   
 94. Glenister II at para. 194. 
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not a reasonable constitutional measure to create an anti-corruption unit 
that is not adequately independent: 
 
That the Republic is bound under international law to create an anti-
corruption unit with appropriate independence is of the foremost 
interpretive significance in determining whether the state has fulfilled its 
duty to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights, 
as section 7(2) requires. Section 7(2) implicitly demands that the steps 
the state takes must be reasonable. To create an anti-corruption unit that 
is not adequately independent would not constitute a reasonable step. In 
reaching this conclusion, the fact that section 231(2) provides that an 
international agreement that Parliament ratifies “binds the Republic” is 
of prime significance. It makes it unreasonable for the state, in fulfilling 
its obligations under section 7(2), to create an anti-corruption entity that 
lacks sufficient independence. 
This is not to incorporate international agreements into our Constitution. 
It is to be faithful to the Constitution itself, and to give meaning to the 
ambit of the duties it creates in accordance with its own clear interpretive 
injunctions. The conclusion that the Constitution requires the state to 
create an anti-corruption entity with adequate independence is therefore 
intrinsic to the Constitution itself.95 
 
The effect was dramatic. Not only does the duty to create an 
adequately independent corruption-fighting unit exist, but it is enforceable 
beyond the international sphere: it is enforceable domestically as well. 
D. Cutting through the divide 
The position thus taken in Glenister cuts through the theoretical 
debate about the relationship between international law and national law—
the monism/dualism debate. Before Glenister, the legal position within 
South Africa regarding international treaties clearly reflected the dualist 
conception—a treaty that has been signed and ratified, but not enacted into 
local law, was regarded as “binding on South Africa [only] on the 
international plane.”96 The nature of the relationships between signatory 
states to a treaty would be based on the common consent of the states 
parties97 and has been likened to those obligations incurred in a private law 
contract. This position dramatically limited the domestic impact of the 
 
 95. Glenister II at paras. 194–95.  
 96. Dugard, supra note 12, at 62. Dugard states that section 231(4) of the Constitution signifies a 
return to the pre-1994 dualist position in South Africa in that “an international agreement or treaty does 
not become part of domestic law until it is enacted into law by national legislation.”  Id.  at 61. 
 97. Reservations to Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide, Advisory 
Opinion, 1951 I.C.J 15, 32 (May 28). 
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state’s undertaking of international human rights obligations. 
Under this conception, if a state in the application of its domestic law 
acts contrary to international law, it commits a breach of its international 
obligations—but solely under international law.98 A “[s]tate that has 
contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislation 
such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the 
obligations undertaken.”99 However, the state is accountable for the breach 
only on the international plane and will incur sanction only if its conduct is 
challenged by other state actors.100 
This conception was largely accepted by scholars even after the 
Constitution was adopted. It was, however, to some extent acknowledged 
that the state’s international law obligations do have some domestic 
relevance. The Constitutional Court has recognized the importance of these 
obligations (both those incorporated into national law and those not yet 
incorporated) when interpreting legislation. For instance, in the Azapo case 
the Court stated that “the lawmakers of the Constitution should not lightly 
be presumed to authorise any law which might constitute a breach of the 
obligations of the State in terms of international law.”101 In addition, in S v. 
Makwanyane, where the Court found the death penalty constitutionally 
invalid, the Court stated that international agreements and customary 
international law provide a framework within which the rights provisions 
of the Constitution could be evaluated and understood.102 
But Glenister goes far further than this. It cuts through the debate and 
draws international law directly into the domestic sphere, using the 
provisions of the Constitution itself. Yet it does so without adopting a 
monist approach. 
Glenister notes that the normal consequence of signing an 
international agreement is the creation of international law obligations for 
the state, enforceable in the international sphere between states.103 
However, the Constitution expressly provides that, when Parliament by 
resolution approves an international agreement, the Republic is “bound.”104 
The significance of this provision cannot be ignored. The Constitution sets 
 
 98. DJ Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law 68 (6th ed. 2004). 
 99. Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations (Lausanne Convention VI, Jan. 30, 1923, Art. 2), 
Advisory Opinion, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 10, at 20 (Feb. 21).  
 100. Dugard, supra note 12, at 62.  
 101. Azanian Peoples Org. (AZAPO) v. President of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 671 
(CC) at para. 26 (S. Afr.).  
 102. S v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 413–4 para. 35 (S. Afr.). 
 103. Glenister II at paras. 92, 182.  
 104. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 14, § 231(2). 
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the limits within which lawmakers exercise their legislative powers. It 
follows that the Constitution places an obligation on lawmakers to pay heed 
to the Republic’s international obligations when drafting legislation. While 
section 231 does not have the effect of elevating all international 
obligations to the status of constitutional obligations, it does mean (when 
read with other provisions of the Constitution) that the state’s international 
obligations are enforceable to some degree on the domestic plane, by 
domestic actors. 
The majority in effect found that the constitutional scheme, taken as a 
whole, cannot mean that the national executive could proclaim and act in 
accordance with one position at the international level, but adopt a different 
approach within the domestic arena. A dichotomy of this sort would raise at 
least rule of law issues—and the rule of law is enshrined as a founding 
value of the Constitution.105 
VI. THE COURT’S SUSPENDED ORDER 
Having established that the state had failed to meet its constitutional 
obligation to establish a sufficiently independent corruption-fighting unit, 
the Court declared Chapter 6A of the SAPS Amendment Act inconsistent 
with the Constitution and invalid to the extent that it failed to secure an 
adequate degree of independence for the DPCI.106 However, the Court 
carefully emphasized the limits to its ruling. It did not prescribe what form 
the revised entity should take. It underlined that “the form and structure of 
the entity in question lie within the reasonable power of the state, provided 
only that whatever form and structure are chosen do indeed endow the 
entity in its operation with sufficient independence.”107 Given that there 
were a number of forms that an independent corruption-fighting unit could 
take (and many policy choices involved), the Court suspended the order of 
constitutional invalidity for eighteen months to give the legislature the 
opportunity to remedy the deficiencies in the legislation.108 
 
 105. The High Court of Australia in Minister of State Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Ah Hin 
Teoh  (1995) 183 CLR 273 (Austl.), upheld the traditional doctrine whereby the “provisions of an 
international treaty to which Australia is party do not form part of Australian law” unless incorporated 
by statute. The Court, however, also held that “the fact that a treaty had not been incorporated did not 
mean that its ratification by the executive held no significance for Australian law.” Instead, the Court 
found that “ratification of the convention itself would constitute an adequate foundation for a legitimate 
expectation . . . that administrative decision-makers would act in conformity with the convention.” 
M.N. Shaw, International Law 121–22 (4th  ed. 1997) (footnotes omitted).  
 106. Glenister II at para. 251 (Order 5).  
 107. Glenister II at para. 196.  
 108. Glenister II at para. 251 (Order 6).  
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VII. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS: MAKING CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS REAL 
Glenister has received lavish praise and acclaim on the one hand,109 
and mordant criticism on the other.110  But its real significance lies in its 
recognition of the impact global law has on a domestic set of laws. It is 
uncertain what Parliament will enact in response to the Court’s order 
regarding the Hawks unit.111 But irrespective of the precise legislative 
response, Glenister has had an impact on South Africa’s law and 
democracy in at least three respects—that is, with regard to the rule of law, 
democratic institutions and the separation of powers, and the continuing 
implications of the decision: 
 
 109. One constitutional commentator called the decision “brave and brilliant” and “a monumental 
judgment in defence of the poor.” Pierre De Vos, Glenister: A Monumental Judgment in Defence of the 
Poor, Constitutionally Speaking Blog (Mar. 18, 2011), http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/glenister-a-
monumental-judgment-in-defence-of-the-poor/. 
 110. Professor Ziyad Motala contended that the decision lacks foundation in either domestic or 
international case law, that the text of the Constitution does not support it, and that the decision ignores 
the separation of powers by interfering in the policy choices of the Executive. See Ziyad Motala, 
Divination through a strange lens, Times Live (Mar. 26, 2011), available at 
http://www.timeslive.co.za/opinion/columnists/article988909.ece/Divination-through-a-strange-lens (S. 
Afr.). He argues that: 
[T]he majority ignored all precedent and said international agreements, even though not made 
self-executing, create an obligation to create an independent anti-corruption entity. What 
makes the majority approach particularly egregious is there is no single international law text 
which supports their conclusion on the relationship between the anti-corruption unit and the 
executive. More importantly, there is not a single precedent from any country in the world 
which the majority could cite to support their interpretation that international law required an 
anti-corruption unit in terms of the framework they posited. 
The decision does break ground. Whilst it does not rely directly on the specific wording of a single 
provision, the ruling draws deeply on the whole text of the Constitution – it looks at the constitutional 
scheme, and deeply wraps into that scheme the state’s international law obligations. The Court has a 
duty to determine the obligations that the Constitution imposes. Although these may be viewed as novel 
or unique in nature, the obligations placed on government stem from the Constitution itself.  
It is worth noting that Professor Motala seems to have misconstrued the majority judgment. He asserts 
that the Court overstepped the separation of powers and interfered with the Executive’s policies choices 
– namely whether the Scorpions should be relocated to the South African Police Service from the 
National Prosecuting Authority: 
“it falls within the power of parliament to establish an anti-corruption unit and to locate it within the 
SAPS. The constitution does not mandate to parliament where to locate the anti-corruption unit. The 
executive has the prerogative to initiate legislation in this regard, and it is ultimately for parliament to 
make a policy choice.” 
However, both the majority and the minority held that it is within the power of Parliament to establish 
an anti-corruption unit and to locate it within the SAPS. The majority expressly found that Constitution  
does not prescribe to Parliament where to locate the anti-corruption unit. See Glenister II at ¶¶ 65–162.  
     111.     Since the delivery of this lecture, Parliament enacted legislation in response to the Court’s 
order.  That legislation is currently subject to legal challenge. See, e.g., Glenister prepares for round 3 
in Concourt over Hawks Act, POLITICSWEB (Nov 29, 2012) available at http://www.politicsweb.co. 
za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page72308?oid=343856&sn=Marketingweb+detail&pid=90389.  
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A. Rule of law 
The judgment provided a dramatic vindication of the capacity of law 
to oversee the exercise of political and parliamentary power. The latter was 
measured against the norms of the Constitution and found wanting. In 
South Africa, the rule of law entails subjecting all power—private, 
corporate and governmental—to scrutiny under constitutional norms. 
Glenister was a powerful illustration of the rule of law in operation, even if 
its implications have yet to be realized. 
B. Democratic institutions and the separation of powers 
The very robustness and innovativeness of the judgment has created 
its own resonances, some of which may require particular note.112 The 
Secretary-General of the ruling African National Congress, for instance, 
portrayed the ruling as an example of judicial “hostility” towards the 
executive and Parliament, which could lead to “instability.”113 But the rule 
of law, which requires an independent judiciary to pronounce on the legal 
limits of state, executive and legislative power, inevitably entails disputed 
decisions.114 Controversy is thus its essential companion. 
The nature of the debate Glenister has evoked is in this important 
sense comparable to that in other constitutional democracies. 
C. Future practical legal developments 
The major substantive innovations of Glenister are, first, the 
domestication of international law; and, second, the reaffirmation that 
governmental measures in pursuance of the section 7(2) obligation to 
respect, protect, promote and fulfill the rights in the Bill of Rights must be 
reasonable. Regarding the domestication of international law, it remains to 
be seen what other international law provisions may yet be found to have a 
domestic Bill of Rights impact through sections 39 and 7. Regarding the 
 
 112. This is illustrated by comments by Mr. Gwede Mantashe, Secretary General of the ANC, 
stating that “there is a great deal of hostility that comes through from the judiciary towards the 
executive and Parliament,” which unless addressed would “cause instability” and “undermine[ ]the 
other arms of government[.]” He went on to say that “you can’t have a judiciary that seeks to arrest the 
functioning of government” as it would create “a perception that says the judiciary is actually 
consolidating opposition to government.”  When asked about the Glenister judgment specifically, he 
stated that the “judgment itself seeks to cast aspersion on the work of Parliament” and that it “ventures 
into political weighting of views.” Interview by Pierre De Vos with Gwede Mantashe, Sec’y Gen. ANC 
(Aug. 18, 2011), available at http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/full-sowetan-interview-with-gwede-
mantashe/.  
 113. See Interview by Mpumelelo Mkhabela with Gwede Mantashe, Sec’y Gen. ANC (Aug. 18, 
2011), available at http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/2011/08/18/judges-moving-into-politics. 
 114. For a recent discussion of the law as limiting state power, with the inevitable concomitant of 
the supervention of judicial rulings, see SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 10-13 (2011).  
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government’s obligation to realize the Bill of Rights, the reasonableness 
requirement that was re-asserted in Glenister may yet have a significant 
impact. 
More broadly still, Glenister may be seen as lighting the as yet un-
mined potential of what is rightly considered a progressive Constitution. It 
lights the way on the possible impact of the South African Constitution’s 
provisions. Glenister involved parliamentary and state power—but the 
Constitution may yet be found to have comparable effects on private 
power. The equality clause, for example, provides that “[e]quality includes 
the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms.”115 The 
implications of this provision—which some may argue include radical 
egalitarianism—have not yet been explored. Only future constitutional 
litigation might tell us whether it does, and perhaps private, not state, 
agencies could face the challenges in issue.116 
CONCLUSION 
Perhaps the most profound lesson of Glenister is that in a globalized 
world there should be no cover from properly undertaken international law 
obligations in the thicket of domestic law. There should be consonance, not 
dissonance, between what governments say and do internationally and what 
they say and do domestically. Our role as lawyers, and our duty, is to 
reduce the gap where it exists. 
 
 
 115. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 2, § 9(2). There is no comparable provision in the Canadian Charter 
of Rights, upon which the South African Bill of Rights was modeled. The Charter’s equality provision 
reads: 
     (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal 
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without 
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or 
physical disability.  
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object the 
amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are 
disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, color, religion, sex, age or mental or 
physical disability.  
See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, § 15, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.)  
 116. Id.   
